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The Post-Industrial Patent System
John R. Thomas*
INTRODUCTION
Post-industrial society has at last come to the regime of patents.
No longer content merely with the proprietization of traditional
technologies, the patent bar has constructed a bold new vision of
the patent system. For as we read with amusement patent instruments claiming methods for swinging a golf club, treating cancer
or administering a mortgage, we come to realize that the patent law
seems poised to embrace the broadest reaches of human experience.
The recent opinions in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.1 and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.2 suggest that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will pass an approving glance upon much of this Patent Office
work product, if called upon to do so.3 In State Street, the plaintiff
held a patent for a data processing system consisting of software
*Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University. The author gratefully
acknowledges the receipt of a writing grant from Oracle Corporation. The many thoughtful remarks of participants in the Symposium on Intellectual Property Rights in Methods
of Doing Business, and in particular those of Joseph Rolla, Pam Samuelson, Richard
Stern and Allen Wagner, contributed mightily to this Article. Thanks are also owed to
the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the Institute of Intellectual Property of Tokyo, Japan, for their support during the drafting of this Article, and to Marty Adelman,
Rochelle Dreyfuss and Mark Lemley for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. A
predecessor version of this Article appeared in volume 40 of the Boston College Law Review.
1. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
2. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), possesses exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent
acquisition and infringement cases. The Patent Office is more properly known as the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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for managing a stock mutual fund. The Federal Circuit not only
held that data transformation through a series of mathematical calculations presented patentable technique, it took the opportunity to
obliterate the venerable proscription on patenting so-called “methods of doing business.”4
The Excel opinion came next, holding that a technique for
arranging information “comfortably” fell within the scope of patentable subject matter.5 In the process the court obliterated the
venerable requirement that an invention work a “physical transformation” in order to be patentable.6 In its place the Federal Circuit required only that a claimed process achieve a useful result, an
exceptionally lenient standard that appears to place few limitations
on the possibilities for private appropriation. Keenly aware of
these holdings, applicants have besieged the Patent Office with applications ranging from financial software to Internet-based business models.7
State Street and Excel present the latest in a series of cases testing the boundaries of the “useful arts,” the constitutional expression of subject matter appropriate for patenting.8 Embodying the
current understanding of this term to mean the “technological
arts,”9 the patent statute further refined patentable subject matter to
4. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
5. Excel, 172 F.3d at 1361.
6. Id.
7. See Jonathan Bick, Adapting Process Patents to Cyberspace, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19,
1998, at 1; Mark Walsh, Internet Companies Seek Protection: Apply For Patents to
Guard Technology, But Litigation May Slow Commerce, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Dec. 21,
1998 at 3; Carol B. Oberdorfer, Patents: ‘Boom’ in Business Method Patent Filings Has
Followed ‘State Street’ Ruling, PTO Says, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
DAILY, Dec. 10, 1998, at D2 (PTO Deputy Commissioner Dickinson expects approximately 300 business method patents to issue in 1999) [hereinafter ‘Boom’ in Business
Method Filings].
8. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This provision provides both for copyright legislation, to promote the development of “science” by “authors,” and for patent legislation, to
promote the development of the “useful arts” by “inventors.” See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d
952, 958 (CCPA 1979), aff’d sub nom., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
(“[T]he constitutionally-stated purpose of granting patent rights to inventors for their discoveries is the promotion of progress in the ‘useful Arts,’ rather than in science.”).
9. See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The exclusive
right, constitutionally derived, was for the national purpose of advancing the useful arts—
the process today called technological innovation.”); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 883
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include processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of
matter.10 The first of these terms appears the most troubling, particularly in light of its circular statutory definition as a “process, art
or method.”11 For without more the scope of the statutory term
“process” appears co-extensive with nearly any possible endeavor,
as almost any imaginable function can be articulated in a series of
steps in the fashion of a patent instrument.12
Determining the appropriate subject matter for patenting is important because a paucity of constraining doctrines allay the proprietary rights associated with granted patents.13 The adjudicated
infringer need not have derived the patented invention from the
patentee, as liability rests solely upon a comparison of the text of
the patent instrument with an accused infringement.14 The patent
law as well lacks a robust experimental use exemption in the nature of copyright law’s fair use privilege.15 The doctrine of patent
misuse too has been reduced to a withered remnant of its once hale
self.16 The decision to subject particular areas of endeavor to the
patent system is therefore of great moment, in effect subjecting entire industries to a private regulatory environment with constantly
shifting contours. Given the contemporary movement towards an
increasingly ambitious sense of patentable subject matter, further
(CCPA 1970); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003-04 (CCPA 1972) (Rich, J., concurring) (“The phrase ‘technological arts,’ as we have used it, is synonymous with the phrase
‘useful arts’ as it appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.”).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994).
12. See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025,
1033-34 (1990) (urging that the extent of patentable subject matter should not be understood to overlap with the ordinary, and exceptionally broad, meaning of the term “process”).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (the patentee has the exclusive right to make, use,
sell, offer to sell, or import into the United States the patented invention).
14. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 860-61
(1998).
15. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (1989); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE
L.J. 177, 222 (1987).
16. See Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922
(1997); Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 1599 (1990).
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reflection upon the appropriate grasp of the patent system appears
worthwhile.
This Article takes as its focus patentable processes as discussed
in State Street and Excel. Part I of this Article briefly reviews the
history of process patents, from early case law under the Statute of
Monopolies to the more recent tumult concerning computerimplemented mathematical algorithms. It then traces the rise of
patents on computerized business models and their confirmation in
State Street. Casting a critical eye towards that opinion, Part I
concludes that the patent eligibility inquiry has been reduced to
one of mere utility. This trend is a disturbing one, for unlike
breakthroughs in computer or biotechnologies, business methods
are vastly older than the patent system itself. Yet only recently
have we come to understand that such techniques lie within the
ambit of the patent system.
In Part II, this Article explores the broad ramifications of the
State Street and Excel opinions. With the Patent Office open for
business method applications, few constraints appear to bar the
grant of patents on other sorts of processes capable of achieving a
pragmatic result. Disconnected from particular physical apparatus,
such patents will set forth not so much technical artifacts, but a
broad category of proprietary modes of analysis, techniques and
protocols from disciplines ranging from the social sciences to the
law. Yet surely the constitutional directive that patents apply to
the “Useful Arts,” as well as our long-held sense of the reach of the
patent system, must somehow cabin the extent of patentable subject matter. We have come to this place, this Article reasons, because of our near-total engagement with the artificial. Discerning
the ontic dimension of technology has perplexed not only the
courts, but epistemologists and the most accomplished of technological observers as well.
Resolving to develop an articulation of those aspects of human
endeavor we may fairly call technological, Part II invokes contemporary thought about technology. Turning to the technological
commentary of Robert McGinn, Paul W. DeVore and Carl Mitcham, this Article develops a typology of traits that distinguish
technology from other forms of human activity. This Article concludes that technological activities are concerned with the produc-
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tion or transformation of artifacts through the systematic manipulation of physical forces. Bounded by interaction with the external
environment, technological activities expend resources and knowledge in order to fabricate or modify products, or to develop procedural systems for so doing. Last, technology presents a form of rational and systematic knowledge, oriented towards efficiency and
capable of being assessed through objective criteria.
This Article continues in Part III by considering how we can
move from a catalogue of characteristics to an essentialist, legally
apt definition of the technological. Recent experience concerning
methods of medical treatment suggests one technique: amendment
of the Patent Act to create particularized patent-free spheres of activity. This Article concludes that due to the obligations of the
TRIPS Agreement, the intellectual property component of the
World Trade Organization treaty, such efforts are unlikely to succeed. Given the TRIPS Agreement mandate that patent rights be
enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of technology,
even the recent amendment concerning medical methods appears
suspect.17
This Article finds a more favorable solution in the standard of
industrial application. Long a part of many foreign laws and fully
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, the standards developed
under the industrial application requirement bear a striking resemblance to contemporary thought about the scope of technological
activities. By restricting patentable advances to the repeatable
production or transformation of material objects, and excluding
subject matter founded upon the aesthetic, social observation or
personal skill, the industrial application requirement would restore
a sense of patentable subject matter that matches our sensibilities.

17. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 365 (GATT Secretariat 1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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I. THE PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF BUSINESS METHODS
A. The Foundational Law of Business Methods
From its very beginnings the patent system has struggled with
the patentability of methods. The forebear of contemporary patent
legislation, the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623,18 extended
the possibility of patenting only to “manufactures.”19 Although the
usual sense of that term suggests human-made artifacts, the rationalization of production techniques brought about by the Industrial
Revolution led courts to entertain a widening conception of patentable subject matter. By the mid-Nineteenth century the English
patent system had extended fully to both products and processes.20
Yet discomfort with the potential scope of process protection remains today. Commonwealth courts that continued to interpret the
term “manufactures” sought to limit the patent system to so-called
“manual arts,”21 an “artificially created state of affairs,”22 or the
production or preservation of vendible products.23
Seemingly aware of the English experience, the United States
Congress expressly declared a “useful art” to be within the scope
of the 1790 Patent Act.24 Section 101 of the current legislation, the
Patent Act of 1952, extends patentability to “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”25 The
statute circularly defines the term “process” to mean any “process,
art or method,” including “a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”26 Supreme

18. 21 Jam. 1, c. 3 (1623). See generally Chris R. Kyle, But a New Button to an Old
Coat: The Enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, 19 J. LEGAL HIST. 203 (1998).
19. The Statute prohibited the Crown from granting monopolies except “to the true
and first inventor or inventors” of “any manner of new manufactures, within this
realme . . . .” 21 Jam. 1, c. 3, § 6.
20. See Crane v. Price, 134 Eng. Rep. 239 (1842).
21. See Maeder v. Bush, 59 C.L.R. 684 (1938).
22. See National Research Dev. Corp.’s Application, [1961] RPC 134 (Austl. 1964).
23. See Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 661 (1795).
24. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 authorizes Congress “To promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994).
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Court elaborations of this definition have included “a method of
doing a thing,”27 “a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result,”28 and “some practicable method or means of
producing a beneficial result or effect.”29
While the United States courts possessed a firmer statutory
grounding for processes than their common law peers, they too experienced difficulties in adjudicating disputes involving process
patents.30 Patented processes are often practiced in secret, with
only the product of the process available to the public. The inchoate nature of processes makes it difficult to evaluate their impact
upon the public domain,31 assess whether they have been infringed
or not,32 and determine how they can be physically marked.33
But particularly troubling within the sphere of processes is the
demarcation of the limits of patentable subject matter. Seemingly
any sort of communicable technique can be articulated as a series
of steps and expressed in the style of a patent claim.34 This sense
is reinforced by the legislative history of the current patent statute,
which the Supreme Court read as holding “that Congress intended
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is
made by man.’”35
27. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 383 (1909).
28. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877).
29. Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268, 15 How. 252, 268 (1853).
30. See Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959,
963 (1986) (noting the problems encountered in interpreting the meaning of “process”).
Earlier treatments can be found at Herman Berman, Method Claims, 17 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 713, 789 (1935); William B. Whitney, Patentable Processes, 19 HARV. L. REV. 30
(1905).
31. See, e.g., Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d
516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946).
32. The Process Patents Amendment Act of 1988 is incorporated into the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 , Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§9001-07,102 Sts. 1107,
1563-67 (1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§154,271,287, and 295 (1998)). See generally
Eli Lilly & Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996); W. Bradley
Haymond, The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988: Solving An Old Problem, But
Creating New Ones, 1989 BYU L. REV. 567; Glenn E.J. Murphy, Note, The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, 9 J. L. & COM. 267 (1989).
33. See, e.g., American Med. Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1070 (1994).
34. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1033.
35. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)). But see
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Perhaps realizing the expansive grasp of proprietization made
possible by the patent system, the courts developed sundry doctrines to cabin its reach. Variously expressed as bars to patents on
business methods,36 as well as such things as “mental steps,” “algorithms,” and “printed matter,” these doctrines purported to hold
certain subject matter unpatentable per se.37 Chief among these
limitations was the longstanding sentiment that “[a]n idea of itself
is not patentable.”38 “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical
expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may
be.”39 Although the policy underpinnings of this restriction were
never articulated well, the Supreme Court once suggested that such
abstractions comprised “the basic tools of scientific and technological work,”40 too central to the process of technological development to be appropriable. Just as the copyright law limits itself to
protection of expression and permits an author’s ideas to enrich the
public domain,41 so too did the patent law concern the physical instantiation of technological knowledge rather than that knowledge
itself.
The bar on patents directed towards business methods represented an extension of the prescription on patenting abstract principles. As early as 1868, the Patent Commissioner sensed that “[i]t

DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY,
VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 1.01 at 5 (Cumulative Supp. June 1999) (“Theoretical or
abstract discoveries are excluded as are discoveries, however practical and useful, in nontechnological arts, such as the liberal arts, the social sciences, theoretical mathematics,
and business and management methodology.”); Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 393-94 (1960) (“Of course, not every kind of an invention
can be patented. Invaluable though it may be to individuals, the public, and national defense, the invention of a more effective organization of the materials in, and the techniques of teaching a course in physics, chemistry or Russian is not a patentable invention . . . . Also outside that group is one of the greatest inventions of our times, the diaper
service.”)
36. See generally E. Robert Yoches & Howard G. Pollock, Is the “Method of Doing
Business” Rejection Bankrupt?, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 73 (Spring 1993); Geo. E. Tew, Method
of Doing Business, 16 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 607 (1934).
37. See Chisum, supra note 30 at 964-71.
38. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874).
39. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
40. Gottchalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
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is contrary to the spirit of the law . . . to grant patents for methods
of book-keeping.”42 Nineteenth century courts also opined that “a
method of transacting common business”43 or “a mere contract”44
were unpatentable. Yet it was not until the Second Circuit’s 1908
opinion in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.45 that the
proscription on business method patents was secured in the treatises.46
The patent at issue in Hotel Security Checking concerned a
“method of and means for cash-registering and account-checking”
designed to prevent fraud by waiters and cashiers.47 The system
employed certain forms that tracked sales and ensured that waiters
submitted appropriate funds at the close of business. The Second
Circuit invalidated the patent on the basis of prior knowledge, finding that the patented technology “would occur to anyone conversant with the business.”48 However, the court further observed
that:
It is manifest that the subject-matter of the claims is not a
machine, manufacture or composition of matter. If within
the language of the statute at all, it must be as a “new and
useful art.” One of the definitions given by Webster of the
word “art” is as follows: “The employment of means to accomplish some desired end; the adaptation of things in the
natural world to the uses of life; the application of knowledge or power to practical purposes.” In the sense of the
patent law, an art is not a mere abstraction. A system of
transacting business disconnected from the means of carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpreta-

42. Ex parte Abraham, 1868 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 59.
43. United States Credit Sys. Co. v. American Credit Indemnity Co., 53 F. 818, 819
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893).
44. In re Moeser, 27 App. D.C. 307, 310 (1906).
45. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
46. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that Hotel Security Checking is “the case frequently cited
as establishing the business method exception to statutory subject matter”); Rinaldo Del
Gallo, III, Are “Methods of Doing Business” Finally Out of Business as a Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403, 405 (1998).
47. 160 F. at 467.
48. Id. at 471.
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tion of the term, an art.49
To similar effect had been the earlier statement of the Commissioner in Ex parte Turner, which held that “a plan or theory of action which, if carried into practice, could produce no physical results proceeding direct[ly] from the operation of the theory or plan
itself is not an art within the meaning of the patent laws.”50 Thus
both court and Patent Office hinged the patentability of processes
upon the presence of a “physical tangible facility” for practicing
the patented technique.51 Importantly, both tribunals also held that
mere “printed matter”—information inscribed upon a substrate for
purposes of presentation—would not suffice to fulfill the requirement. Only a physical structure exhibiting a functional relationship between the substrate and written material would enter the
realm of the patentable.52
Numerous decisions applied this standard while denying patents on business-oriented inventions. Citing a lack of physical
structure other than printed matter, the courts struck down patents
claiming a method for transferring writings from manuscript form
to printed publication form;53 a system of blank checks and stubs
useful in a combined checking/savings account;54 and a system for
national coordination of firefighting efforts.55 Some patents were
upheld: a railway ticket consisting of a base and separable attachment was held not to “relat[e] merely to ‘a method of transacting
business,’” but to involve a unique physical structure.56
The requirement of physical instantiation is not an illogical
one. It ties the relatively abstract proprietary interests created by
the patent law to the corporeal things that form the traditional objects of property. The identifiable boundaries that result better en49. Id. at 469.
50. 1894 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 36, 37-38.
51. Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange Scrip-Book Co., 187 F. 984, 986 (7th Cir.
1911).
52. See In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (CCPA 1969); In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007
(CCPA 1967); Morton C. Jacobs, Editorial Note, The Patentability of Printed Matter:
Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475 (1950).
53. In re Bolongaro, 62 F.2d 1059 (CCPA 1933).
54. In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910 (CCPA 1934).
55. In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324 (CCPA 1942).
56. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443, 446 (6th Cir. 1913).
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able individuals to complete transactions, form markets and determine the sorts of conduct that will be judged permissible. The
stricture that processes generate embodied results also places appropriate limits upon infringement liability, for the courts may far
more readily observe the market impact of manipulated objects
than trace the effect of more rarefied teachings. In all these matters the patent law reflected the precepts of the copyright law,
which offers protection only to works fixed in a tangible medium
of expression.57

B. Computer-Implemented Methods
The demand for physical structure proved a serviceable patent
eligibility standard for most of the history of the patent system.
But the rise of computer technology would sorely test whether the
presence of physical structure was a useful discriminant between
those processes which could be patented and that which could not.
Applicants in the computer arts urged that electronic circuits and
the software to command them were as industrial in character as
more traditional technologies. But examiners initially cast an extremely wary eye at their applications. They recognized that much
of the precedent exempting abstract ideas from the patent system
would be swept away by allowing patents on computers programmed to perform newly invented mathematical algorithms.58
57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1994); See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the
Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1380-82 (1989).
58. The bookshelves groan under the weight of numerous articles discussing the
early interaction between computer technologies and the patent system, as well as the
subsequent debate over the patenting of computer-related inventions. More recent publications on this topic include: Brian Richard Yoshida, Claiming Electronic and Software
Technologies: the Effect of the Federal Circuit Decisions in Alappat, Warmerdam, and
Lowry on the Claiming of Mathematical Algorithms and Data Structures, 45 BUFF. L.
REV. 457 (1997); Stephen G. Kunin, Patentability of Computer Related Inventions in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 833
(1995); Maximilian R. Peterson, Note, Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Was It a Patentable Machine or an Unpatentable “Algorithm”? On Principle and Expediency in
Current Patent Law Doctrines Relating to Computer-Implemented Inventions, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 90 (1995); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
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The Supreme Court entered this debate when it granted certiorari in Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972.59 There the applicant claimed
a method of converting numerals from binary-coded decimal to
pure binary format. The steps of the method comprised mathematical operations that shuffled a sequence of bits in order to express appropriately a particular number. The application contained
claims both reciting the method as performed by a computer, and
the abstract performance of the method without regard to any particular physical means. The method had broad application in data
processing tasks, ranging from “the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to researching [the] law books” in the
words of the Court.60
In a cryptic opinion, the Court upheld the Patent Office’s rejection of the application. The Court first recited the traditional requirement that patentability hinged upon the “[t]ransformation and
reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing.’”61 Arguably,
at least those claims reciting computer implementation of the numerical conversion method did involve some sort of physical conversion. Operation of the computer would not only manipulate
those electrical signals representing the data, but generate electrical
signals in order to instruct the computer to perform certain tasks.
Yet the Court found this hardware insufficient, drawing its analysis
to a close with a self-styled “nutshell”:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. The mathematical formula involved here
has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt
the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself.62
Thus the Court held that computerization of mathematical
59.
60.
61.
62.

409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71-72.
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equations could not shift them from the realm of ideas to that of
industry. Internal circuitry operations were not enough to uphold
even those claims reciting computer hardware, for barring the
presence of an idiot savant or enormous mechanical computer to
perform the claimed conversions rapidly, a digital computer presented the only context in which the equations had meaning. The
digital computer amounted only to “nominal apparatus” that placed
no meaningful limitations upon the scope of the claims.63
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had numerous opportunities to follow the lead of the Supreme Court. In In re Maucorps,64 the applicant had claimed a “computing system for processing data” that determined the optimum number of sales
representatives for a given organization as well as the number of
times they should visit customers over a period of time.65 The invention consisted of various formulae that Maucorps had derived
from sales experience and implemented via software written in the
Fortran programming language. The court affirmed the rejection
of the application, reasoning that the “claimed invention as a whole
comprises each and every means for carrying out a solution technique for a set of equations wherein one number is computed from
a set of numbers.”66
In re Meyer67 was to similar effect. Meyer’s application described a computer-based expert system for aiding a neurologist in
diagnosing patients. His claims were drafted broadly, calling for a
more generalized “process for indentifying [sic] locations of probable malfunction in a complex system.”68 In essence Meyer called
for test data to be accumulated and conclusions reached in accordance with statistical formulae. The court again affirmed the rejection of the application, quoting with approval the Patent Office’s
conclusion that the “process recited is an attempt to patent a
mathematical algorithm rather than a process for producing a

63. See Richard H. Stern, Tales from the Algorithm War: Benson to Iwahashi, It’s
Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 371 (1991).
64. 609 F.2d 481 (CCPA 1979).
65. Id. at 482.
66. Id. at 486.
67. 688 F.2d 789 (CCPA 1982).
68. Id. at 792.
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product.”69
This early resistance to patents on computer-related inventions
faded over time, however. By the early 1980’s, Patent Office examiners found more favor in computer-related inventions, and the
courts seemed more willing to uphold the issued patents.70 While
the omnipresence of computer technology and its significance to
the United States economy may have carried the day, one suspects
that both the Patent Office and courts grew weary of the relentless
argumentation of a bar that has scant motivation to favor restraints
upon the scope of patenting. Also influential was the 1980 opinion
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,71 a Supreme Court decision that
opened the patent system to biotechnology.
That opinion involved the Patent Office rejection of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty’s application claiming an artificially generated
microorganism. At the Supreme Court, chief among the arguments
of the Patent Office Solicitor was that because genetic technology
could not have been foreseen at the time the patent statute was
drafted, the resolution of the patentability of such inventions
should be left to Congress. En route to reversing the Patent Office
decision, the Court disagreed: “A rule that unanticipated inventions
are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the
patent law that anticipation undermines patentability.”72
The difficulty with this reasoning is that it mixes two logical
classes, that of individual technologies with the entire domain of
invention. As neatly illustrated by Bertrand Russell in his famous
debate with Father Copleston, the fact that every person has a
mother does not lead to the conclusion that the human race as a
whole must have a mother.73 And simply because the patent statute in part judges patentability through an anticipation standard
hardly suggests that we lack other principles to govern the extent
of patentable subject matter.
69. Id. at 794.
70. See, e.g., In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (CCPA 1977); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d
152 (CCPA 1976).
71. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
72. Id. at 316.
73. See Bertrand Russell & F.C. Copleston, A Debate on the Existence of God, reprinted in BERTRAND RUSSELL ON GOD AND RELIGION 123, 131 (Al Seckel ed., 1986).
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However apparent the weaknesses of this aspect of Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court leaned heavily upon its reasoning in its
1981 opinion in Diamond v. Diehr.74 The Diehr applicants
claimed a process for operating a rubber-molding press with the
aid of a digital computer. Their computer continuously monitored
the temperature within a press and employed the well-known Arrhenius equation to calculate the amount of time required to cure
rubber placed within the press. When the computer calculated that
the elapsed time equaled the actual molding time, it signaled a device to open the press.75
At the Patent Office, the examiner considered that the process
steps that were implemented in computer software were nonstatutory. The examiner further reasoned that the “remaining steps—
installing rubber in the press and the subsequent closing of the
press—were ‘conventional and necessary to the process and cannot
be the basis of patentability.’”76 The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals reversed the rejection, however. Following a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed.77 Relying upon Chakrabarty,
the Court explained that the applicants:
do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they
seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the
use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose
from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all
of the other steps in their claimed process. These include
installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a digital computer, and automatically opening the
press at the proper time.78
A number of difficulties attend the Diehr Court’s analysis as

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 180-81.
Chakrabarty, 450 U.S. at 193.
Id. at 187.
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well. The advancement offered by the Diehr applicants consisted
of mathematical computations. The physical steps on which so
much depended—reading a thermometer and signaling a press
door to open—were trite. Allowing patentability to hinge upon the
minimal recitation of these steps within the claims seems unfounded, for they merely stated the only valid technical context in
which the mathematics would operate. They did not present meaningful limitations upon the scope of the claims. To the extent that
the prohibition against patenting ideas presents sound policy, allowing applicants to avoid these limitations through artful claim
drafting appears unwise.
The patent bar nonetheless proved attentive to the lessons of
Diehr. Technologists proved increasingly adept at claiming newly
formulated mathematical equations alongside some sort of physical
manifestation. In response the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals formed the two-part Freeman-Walter-Abele test. Initiated in
1978 by the In re Freeman79 decision, the court refined the test in
the 1980 opinion In re Walter.80 Following the Supreme Court’s
issuance of its Diehr decision,81 the court once again modified the
standard in its 1982 decision In re Abele.82 As the Federal Circuit
later described:
It is first determined whether a mathematical algorithm is
recited directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, it is next
determined whether the claimed invention as a whole is no
more than the algorithm itself; that is, whether the claim is
directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not applied to
or limited by physical elements or process steps. Such
claims are nonstatutory. However, when the mathematical
algorithm is applied in one or more steps of an otherwise
statutory process claim, or one or more elements of an otherwise statutory apparatus claim, the requirements of section 101 are met.83
79. 573 F.2d 1237 (CCPA 1978).
80. 618 F.2d 758 (CCPA 1980).
81. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
82. 684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982).
83. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053,
1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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The Federal Circuit employed the Freeman-Walter-Abele test
both to reject84 and allow85 various applications as patentable subject matter. But its decisions demonstrated an increasingly permissive tenor, and a glance through the Patent Office Gazette showed
a growing number of issued patents directed towards computerrelated inventions.
Emboldened by this state of affairs,86 applicants eventually
abandoned even the pretext of tying the mathematics to a traditionally industrial process such as curing rubber. Instead the tangible
thing upon which patentability was keyed was the combination of a
computer and the software-driven electrical signals employed to
instruct it. Because general purpose computers could be conceived
as special purpose computers once instructed by software, virtually
any fragment of software code could be viewed as statutory subject
matter.87
Although this reasoning had been impliedly rejected in Benson,88 it met with great success in the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in In re Alappat.89 There, the court considered a claimed
apparatus useful for generating smooth and continuous lines for
display on an oscilloscope. Alappat’s invention completed various
mathematical computations in order to convert so-called “vector
list data” into “pixel illumination intensity data”; that is, it converted one set of numbers into another set of numbers.90 The majority held that the claimed invention comprised statutory subject
matter:
Although many, or arguably even all, of the means ele84. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
85. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
86. See Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d 1053; Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370. But see In re Grams,
888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
87. This argument was successful in In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (CCPA
1969). See also In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 n.29 (CCPA 1969).
88. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
89. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also John A. Burtis, Comment, Towards a
Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-Related Patentability in Light of In re Alappat, 79
MINN. L. REV. 1129 (1995); Sang Hui Michael Kim, In re Alappat: A Strict Statutory Interpretation Determining Patentable Subject Matter Relating to Computer Software?, 13
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 635 (1995); W. Wayt King, Jr., Recent Development, The Soul of the Virtual Machine: In re Alappat, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 575 (1995).
90. 33 F.3d at 1537-39.
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ments recited in claim 15 represent circuitry elements that
perform mathematical calculations, which is essentially
true of all digital electrical circuits, the claimed invention
as a whole is directed to a combination of interrelated elements which combine to form a machine for converting
discrete waveform data samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display
means. This is not a disembodied mathematical concept
which may be characterized as an “abstract idea,” but rather
a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.91
The en banc court also quickly distinguished Maucorps92 and
Meyer.93 According to the court, “Maucorps dealt with a business
methodology for deciding how salesmen should best handle respective customers and Meyer involved a ‘system’ for aiding a
neurologist in diagnosing patients. Clearly, neither of the alleged
‘inventions’ in those cases falls within any § 101 category.”94
Reconciliation of Alappat with Benson appears difficult. Both
inventions concerned data transformations performed by a computer using mathematical calculations. Yet, according to the Federal Circuit, the Benson Court had instead attempted to express the
concept that “certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced
to some type of practical application, and thus that subject matter is
not, in and of itself, entitled to patent protection.”95 That the applicant in Benson could have circumvented the Supreme Court’s objection simply by naming one practical application for his algorithm seems quite implausible, particularly since the Court took
pains to catalogue some of the many uses of that algorithm in its
opinion.96
After Alappat, the long-running saga concerning the patentability of computer-related inventions seemed of little more than his91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1544 (footnotes omitted).
609 F.2d 481; see supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
688 F.2d 789; see supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
33 F.3d at 1541.
Id. at 1543 (footnote omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
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torical interest. Seemingly any applicant who drafted patent claims
within the strictures of the vitiated physicality standard could obtain a patent on nearly any data processing technique. That the advance was found not in computer circuitry or programming techniques was besides the point; so long as the technique could be
performed by a computer and was so characterized, then a patent
could issue.
Given that many such techniques are only practically realizable
when performed on a computer, this minimal stricture was one
many applicants could live with. Yet few failed to realize that the
artful claims drafting inspired by Diehr and Alappat comprised little more than a charade.97 Although a robust physical transformation requirement was itself quite defensible, its hobbled remnant
proved so provocative of contorted claims drafting that it appears
scarcely worth maintaining.98 Some jurists seemed willing to
abandon the requirement of physicality in favor of a more expansive vision of patentability, as suggested by Judge Newman’s view
in a 1994 dissent that:
[A] statutory “process” is limited only in that it must be
technologically useful. . . . All mathematical algorithms
transform data, and thus serve as a process to convert initial
conditions or inputs into solutions or outputs, through
transformation of information. . . . The test is simply
whether the mathematical formula or equation is all that is
claimed, or whether the procedures involving the specified
mathematics are part of a useful process. When the latter
requirement is met the subject matter is statutory.99
Only four years would elapse before a view of statutory subject
matter that embraced the “transformation of information” would
make its way from the dissent to the majority. The occasion was
the inevitable resolution of the conflict between the venerable case
law on business methods and more recent developments on computer-related inventions, the Federal Circuit decision in State Street
97. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1564 (Archer, C.J., dissenting).
98. See John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, And The Tangible: Drafting Patent
Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219 (1998).
99. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.100
C. Computer-Implemented Business Methods
Signature Financial Group held the patent at suit.101 Directed
to a “Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration,” it described a data processing system for implementing an investment structure known as a “Hub and Spoke”
system. This system allowed individual mutual funds (Spokes) to
pool their assets in an investment portfolio (Hub) organized as a
partnership. According to the patent, this investment regime provided the advantageous combination of economies of scale in administering investments coupled with the tax advantages of a partnership.102
Maintaining a proper accounting of this sophisticated financial
structure proved difficult. Indeed, due to “the complexity of the
100. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Also of note was the district court opinion in
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
564 F. Supp. 1358, 1364, 1369 (D. Del. 1983) (holding that Merrill Lynch’s claimed
“system for processing and supervising a plurality of composite subscriber [investment]
accounts” comprised “statutory subject matter because the claims allegedly teach a
method of operation on a computer to effectuate a business activity”). Paine, Webber is
discussed in Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1120-21.
101. United States Patent No. 5,193,056 (March 9, 1993). The first claim of the
‘056 patent provided:
1. A data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of
a portfolio established as a partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of
funds, comprising:
(a) computer processor means for processing data;
(b) storage means for storing data on a storage medium;
(c) first means for initializing the storage medium;
(d) second means for processing data regarding assets in the portfolio and
each of the funds from a previous day and data regarding increases or decreases
in each of the funds, [sic, funds’] assets and for allocating the percentage share
that each fund holds in the portfolio;
(e) third means for processing data regarding daily incremental income, expenses, and net realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such
data among each fund;
(f) fourth means for processing data regarding daily net unrealized gain or
loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund; and
(g) fifth means for processing data regarding aggregate year-end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio and each of the funds.
Id.
102. 149 F.3d at 1370.
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calculations, a computer or equivalent device is a virtual necessity
to perform the task.”103 Signature’s patented system purported to
allow administrators to “monitor and record the financial information flow and make all calculations necessary for maintaining a
partner fund financial services configuration.”104 In addition it
tracked “all the relevant data determined on a daily basis for the
Hub and each Spoke, so that aggregate year end income, expenses,
and capital gain or loss can be determined for accounting and for
tax purposes for the Hub and, as a result, for each publicly traded
Spoke.”105 Crucially, Signature’s invention marked no advance in
computer technology or mathematical calculations. The basis for
patentability was the uniqueness of the investment package Signature claimed in its patent.
Following issuance of the patent, Signature entered into licensing negotiations with a competitor, State Street Bank, that ultimately proved unsuccessful. State Street then brought a declaratory judgment action against Signature, seeking the invalidity of
the patent. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of State Street under two alternative grounds.106 First, the court
applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test,107 concluding that:
At bottom, the invention is an accounting system for a certain type of financial investment vehicle claimed as means
for performing a series of mathematical functions. Quite
simply, it involves no further physical transformation or reduction than inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing numbers. The same functions
could be performed, albeit less efficiently, by an accountant
armed with pencil, paper, calculator, and a filing system.108
The court then buttressed its holding by turning to “the
long-established principle that business ‘plans’ and ‘systems’ are

103. Id. at 1371.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502
(D. Mass. 1996).
107. Id. at 512-15.
108. Id. at 515.
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not patentable.”109 The court judged that “patenting an accounting
system necessary to carry on a certain type of business is tantamount to a patent on the business itself. Because such abstract
ideas are not patentable, either as methods of doing business or as
mathematical algorithms,” the patent was held invalid.110
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed in a magisterial opinion. Writing for a three-judge panel, Judge Rich found the patent
claimed not an abstract idea but a programmed machine that produced a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”111 “This renders it
statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed in
numbers, such as price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss.”112 According to the court, “[t]he question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the
four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to—process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—but rather on the
essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.”113 The court further trumpeted that:
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series
of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or calculation, because it produces “a useful, concrete and tangible result”—a final share price momentarily
fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.114
The Federal Circuit then turned to the district court’s business
methods rejection, opting to “take [the] opportunity to lay this illconceived exception to rest.”115 According to Judge Rich, restrictions upon patents for methods of doing business were illconceived from the start and no longer the law under the 1952 Pat109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 516.
149 F.3d at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1375 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1375.
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ent Act. Following issuance of the State Street opinion, methods
of doing business were to be subject only to the same patentability
analysis as any other sort of process.116
State Street is a curious opinion on a number of fronts. First,
the court’s characterization of the patented invention as generating
a “final share price” appears inaccurate.117 Neither the term “final
share price” nor its reasonable approximation appears in any of
Signature’s claims, which are instead directed towards the processing of data relating to portfolio income, expenses and net gain or
loss.118 This interpretation seems especially odd in light of an earlier opinion by Judge Rich, In re Iwahashi,119 which admonished
that the precedents have “held some claims statutory and other
claims nonstatutory, depending entirely on what they said. We
have to do the same here.”120
The State Street court also squarely stated that the district court
had erred by applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. According
to the court, “[a]fter Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject matter.”121 As a matter of
chronology this statement is plainly false: the Supreme Court issued Chakrabarty in 1980 and Diehr in 1981.122 The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals authored Abele in 1982.123
This aberrant reinterpretation of Diehr and Chakrabarty also
does a disservice to any number of Federal Circuit opinions which
applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in patent eligibility determinations.124 It further seems to misread Chakrabarty. There
the Court relied on Parker v. Flook, which expressly stated that a
“claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a
specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”125
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 102.
See supra text accompanying note 101.
888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1374. For more on Iwahashi, see Thomas, supra note 98, at 258-59.
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982).
E.g., Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1053; Grams, 888 F.2d at 835.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18 (1978).
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This standard appears to provide ample basis for striking down
Signature’s claimed “system,” which does nothing more than
maintain the accounting books for a particular financial product.
As well, the Federal Circuit failed to acknowledge fully Maucorps126 and Meyer,127 as well as the manner in which those cases
had been treated in Alappat.128 Each of those opinions rejected
claims quite analogous to those of Signature Financial Group’s
patent.129 The State Street court dismissed this precedent quickly,
stating only that “closer scrutiny of these cases reveals that the
claimed inventions in both Maucorps and Meyer were rejected as
abstract ideas under the mathematical algorithm exception, not the
business method exception.”130 But this distinction tells us only
that the district court’s first basis for invalidating Signature’s patent should have stood. It also fails to inform us why the statement
of the en banc court in Alappat that “a business methodology”
does not fulfill the strictures of § 101 is no longer the law.131
In perhaps the most telling line of the opinion, the State
Street Court further told us that the key inquiry concerning statutory subject matter involves “the essential characteristics of the
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.”132 This remark
appears to collapse the subject matter inquiry into another patentability requisite, that of utility. The utility standard has always
been a minimal one, requiring only that the invention confer a
“specific benefit . . . in currently available form.”133 The difficulty
with this approach is that, since the early Nineteenth Century, the
utility standard has been understood to present a distinct, additional
hurdle to patentability.134 Not only does this dramatic reinterpreta126. 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
127. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
128. 33 F.3d 1526, 1540-41.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
130. 149 F.3d at 1376.
131. 33 F.3d at 1541; see supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
132. 149 F.3d at 1375.
133. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966). See also In re Brana, 51
F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Andrew T. Kight , Note, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO Utility Guidelines in Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997 (1998); Michelle
L. Johnson, In re Brana and the Utility Examination Guidelines: A Light at the End of the
Tunnel?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 285 (1996).
134. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C. Mass. 1817)(No. 8,568); Bedford
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tion of § 101 seem to relegate that statute’s recitation of categories
of patentable subject matter into little more than claim formatting
protocols,135 it also presents an extremely vitiated gatekeeper to the
patent system.136
At bottom, the Federal Circuit also said vastly more than it
needed to with regard to methods of doing business. The claims of
the Signature patent were not directed to methods at all, but to
computer hardware programmed to perform certain calculations.137
In fact, the court noted that the patent application as filed originally
included method claims. But the applicant had abandoned them
following examiner concerns over patentable subject matter.138
Given the absence of method claims in the patent at suit, not due to
happenstance but because of their knowing deletion by the applicant, this portion of the State Street opinion seemed nothing more
than dicta. The weight accorded to this discussion would prove
considerable, however, as the Federal Circuit demonstrated in its
next significant patent eligibility case.
D. Beyond State Street: AT&T v. Excel Communications
The appeal in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc.139
arose from AT&T’s efforts to enforce its ‘184 patent, which was
directed towards the composition of billing records used in telephone networks.140 The ‘184 patent expressly claimed a method
v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217).
135. See supra text accompanying note 20.
136. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 811-12 (1988) (noting that the utility
requirement has “devolved over the years into a rather minimal obstacle to obtaining a
patent.”).
137. 149 F.3d at 1371-72.
138. 149 F.3d at 1371.
139. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
140. Claim 1 of the ‘184 patent recited:
A method for use in a telecommunications system in which interexchange calls
initiated by each subscriber are automatically routed over the facilities of a particular one of a plurality of interexchange carriers associated with that subscriber, said method comprising the steps of:
generating a message record for an interexchange call between an originating
subscriber and a terminating subscriber, and
including, in said message record, a primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indicator having a value which is a function of whether or not the interexchange car-
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for a phone company to determine whether both the caller and the
recipient of a long-distance telephone subscribed to the company’s
network. If so, the phone company could provide a different billing treatment to such calls, most likely discounting the fee in order
to encourage both individuals to subscribe to the same phone company.
The invention relied upon the fact that when a customer makes
a long-distance telephone call, the telephone network contemporaneously maintains billing records. These records include such information as the originating and terminating telephone numbers, as
well as the length of the call. Also associated with the call is data
indicating an individual’s chosen “primary interexchange carrier,”
or long-distance service provider.
The claimed invention called for the addition of a discrete item
of data, termed the “PIC indicator,” to the billing record. The
value of the PIC indicator was determined by applying the logical
AND function to the data identifying the primary interexchange
carriers of the originator and recipient of the long-distance call. If
both customers have subscribed to the same phone company, the
PIC indicator is set to a logical “one.” Otherwise the PIC indicator
remains at the value of “zero.” The phone company may then
readily apply its discounted rate to any call where the PIC indicator
is set to one, without more extensive data processing at the time of
billing.
In an opinion issued prior to the release of State Street, the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware held that
the claimed invention was without § 101.141 Judge Robinson described the ‘184 patent as “claiming an invention whereby certain
information that is already known within a telecommunications
system (the PICs of the originating and terminating subscribers) is
simply retrieved for an allegedly new use in billing.”142 With this
sense of the claimed invention, the court held that “a change in the
rier associated with said terminating subscriber is a predetermined one of said
interexchange carriers.
172 F.3d at 1354.
141. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5346 (Cov. A.
96-434-SLR) (D. Del. March 27, 1998), rev’d, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
142. Id. at *20.
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data’s format should not serve to convert nonpatentable subject
matter into patentable subject matter.”143
Following an appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. Writing for
a three-judge panel, Judge Plager had little trouble finding that the
asserted claims “comfortably” fell within the scope of patentable
subject matter.144 The Federal Circuit quickly disposed of Excel’s
argument that because AT&T’s claims did not recite a physical
transformation, they were not patentable subject matter. Judge
Plager reasoned that physical transformation was not an absolute
requisite for patentability, but merely one way of determining
whether the patented invention achieved a “useful, concrete, tangible result.”145 Because AT&T’s claimed process produced “a
number which had a specific meaning,” it could be employed in a
discrete setting and was therefore patentable.146
In working this abrupt end to the physical transformation standard, long understood as the touchstone of patentability of method
claims, the Federal Circuit distinguished an impressive number of
earlier decisions. In particular, the court continued to toss fuel
upon the funeral pyre of Freeman-Walter-Abele. “Whatever may
be left” of the Freeman-Walter-Abele standard was not of value
here, according to the court, because Diehr and Charkrabarty had
not required that a process manipulate physical elements to be patentable.147 The Excel court too did not address the unusual timing
demanded by this reasoning, nor did it seem to have reviewed the
text of the Chakrabarty opinion. Three more recent Federal Circuit opinions suggesting that AT&T’s claims were unpatentable
were distinguished or deemed “unhelpful.”148
In closing the opinion, the Federal Circuit was quick to note
that it had only addressed the subject of patent eligibility, and that
“the ultimate validity of these claims depends upon satisfying the
other requirements for patentability such as those set forth in 35
143. Id. at *22.
144. 172 F.3d at 1361.
145. Id. at 1357 (quoting State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373).
146. Id. at 1359 (citing Arrythmia, 958 F.3d at 1060).
147. Id. at 1359.
148. Id. (discussing In re Grams, 885 F.2d 835; In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 794; In re
Wamerdam, 33 F.3d 1354).
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U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112.”149 Yet the claims at issue in these
two opinions call into question the extent that § 103, the provision
demanding the nonobviousness of patented inventions, and § 112,
a statute that in part requires the drafting of definite claims, are being enforced. In Excel, one wonders why a skilled artisan would
not have found obvious the use of the logical AND standard to the
data representing the primary interexchange carrier.
The claims at issue in State Street also appear deficient. By
merely reciting a menu of available data operations, each of Signature’s claims presents no more than an unpatentable aggregation.
Such claims fail to state how the various claimed means elements
interact with each other, either functionally or structurally. The
case law has interpreted § 112 to demand a showing of the relationship among the elements of Signature’s inventions, perhaps
through the recitation of a data bus wired to various hardware capable of performing the claimed functions.150 That Signature’s
claims do not comply with § 112 seems particularly troubling, for
if a claim is not presented in a manner cognizable to the patent law,
then it would seem difficult to determine whether that subject matter complies with § 101 or not.
Despite these weaknesses in the State Street and Excel opinions, each issue of the Patent Office Gazette appears to have taken
these two opinions into account. As but one example of recent
Patent Office work product, consider the following claim:
A method for remodeling an existing building, said method
comprising:
cataloging design ideas that utilize predetermined building
products;

149. Id. at 1361.
150. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 645 (noting this familiar requirement of
claims drafting). See In re Worrest, 201 F.2d 930, 934 (CCPA 1953) (The court defined
an unpatentable aggregation as “a device having two or more unrelated, independent
units or elements, each of which performs its function separately, uninfluenced by and
indifferent to the action of the other units. There is no essential or inherent correlation, or
cooperation, or coordination of elements which mutually contribute to a common purpose
or result, other than mere convenience due to juxtaposition or collection of the units in a
common setting.”).
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presenting the design ideas to a client;
allowing the client to select a design idea . . . ;[and]
preparing a visual image . . . representing the building remodeled with the design idea selected by the client.151
Wholly divorced from particular artifacts, this claim broadly
appropriates an architectural services technique. Recently issued
Patent Office Guidelines further suggest that other business, artificial intelligence and mathematical processing applications are
firmly within the grasp of the patent system.152
Of course, it is the fate of the Patent Office to lead the courts
on patentability standards.153 In some sense State Street merely
presents the latest in a series of cases confirming Patent Office
practice as to the subject matter appropriate for patenting. But in
many ways State Street presents the most disturbing episode yet. It
seems one thing for courts to place biotechnologies and computerrelated inventions within the patent system, but quite another to
hold that business methods may be patented. One need only recall
the techniques of the Hanseatic League154 or the theory of mercan-

151. United States Patent No. 5,668,736 (Sept. 16, 1997).
152. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 2100 (7th ed. 1998) (available at
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html>).
153. As Judge Mayer noted in Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d
1464, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Mayer, J., concurring):
Every year about 100,000 new patents are issued, resulting in well over
1,000,000 patents in force in this country at any time. These patents are issued
by the Patent and Trademark Office clothed in a presumption of validity as a
matter of law and of practicality. The Patent and Trademark Office, after all,
consumes a tremendous annual budget, nearly a half billion dollars, and employs thousands of highly trained individuals working to insure that only deserving patents are issued. This court, on the other hand, might see only one
hundred and fifty or so contested patents a year, including repeaters. We therefore see at most no more than 0.015% of the patents in force.
(citations omitted).
Id.
154. See T.H. LLOYD, ENGLAND AND THE GERMAN HANSE, 1157-1611: A STUDY OF
THEIR TRADE AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY (Cambridge University Press, 1991);
JOHANNES SCHILDHAUER, THE HANSA: THEIR HISTORY AND CULTURE (Katherine Vanovitch trans. 1985).
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tilism155 to realize that such methods are far older than the patent
system itself. Yet only recently have we been made to understand
that this sort of practical knowledge may be appropriated via the
regime of patents.156 The remainder of this Article discusses the
appropriate range of patentable subject matter, next exploring the
expansive patenting opportunities suggested by State Street and
Excel.
II. THE EXTENT OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL ARTS
That the dialogue of the patent law itself scarcely limits the
possibilities of patenting presents a source of concern. If the only
remaining restraints upon patentable subject matter are the lenient
strictures of novelty or utility, then the pretensions of the patent
system have expanded vastly beyond its traditional province of industrial technologies.157 For although the patent system is caught
up with technology, it has done little to refine its sense of its own
subject matter other than to say that patents properly canvas the entire waterfront of technique. In the regime of patents technology
has become not merely artificial object or industrial activity, but
the entire body of human knowledge unencumbered by further
155. See LARS MAGNUSSON, MERCANTILISM: THE SHAPING OF AN ECONOMIC
LANGUAGE (1994); LEONARD GOMES, FOREIGN TRADE AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY:
MERCANTILIST AND CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVES (1987).
156. In this regard, State Street holds particularly unsettling possibilities for inventors that maintained their business methods as trade secrets. Under the rule articulated by
Judge Learned Hand in Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts, 153 F.2d
516 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946), a firm that put a business method
into commercial practice for more than one year, but maintained the method as a trade
secret, is barred from obtaining a patent on the invention. Moreover, third parties are free
to patent the method. See D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). Because business method innovators may have opted for trade secret protection based upon the traditional rule that such methods were unpatentable, a practical effect of State Street may be to convert the first inventors of business methods into infringers.
Congress attempted to respond to this concern by enacting the First Inventor Defense
Act of 1999, which was signed into law on November 19, 1999. Pub. L. No. 106-113
(1999). This statute creates a defense available to those charged with infringing “a
method of doing or conducting business” who reduced the invention to practice one year
before the effective filing date of the patent, and who “commercially used” that subject
matter in the United States before the effective filing date. See Signing of IP Reforms
Amends Work-for-Hire, Leaves ‘First Inventor Defense’ Unclear, 59 PAT., TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 330, 331-332 (Dec. 2, 1999).
157. See supra Part IA.
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qualification.
Among the more reviled Patent Office grants has been its 1968
patent on a method of swallowing a pill.158 Now we need scant
imagination to envision patents on corporate ingestion of poison
pills as well. With business and medical techniques159 firmly under wing, and patents on sports methods160 and procedures of psychological analysis161 trickling out of the Patent Office, patents appropriating almost any sort of communicable practice seem easily
attainable. Claims to methods within the disciplines of sociology,
political science, economics and the law appear to present only the
nearest frontier for the regime of patents. Under increasingly permissive Federal Circuit case law, techniques within such far-flung
disciplines as language,162 the fine arts,163 and theology164 appear
as well to be within the realm of patentability.
We have good reason to doubt whether such innovations lie
within the “useful arts,” the constitutional stricture concerning patentable subject matter.165 The sparse materials we possess regarding this term suggests that the Framers were unlikely to see every

158. United States Patent No. 3,418,999 (Dec. 31, 1968).
159. See infra notes 232-244 and accompanying text.
160. See generally Carl A. Kukkonen, III, Be a Good Sport and Refrain from Using
My Patented Putt: Intellectual Property Protection For Sports Related Movements, 80 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 808 (1998).
161. United States Patent No. 5,190,458 (Mar. 2, 1993) (“Character assessment
method”).
162. See United States Patent No. 4,864,503 (Sep. 5, 1989) (“Method of using a
created international language as an intermediate pathway in translation between two national languages”); See also The Wired Diaries, 7.01 WIRED 97, 135 (Jan. 1999) (Attributing to Norman Fischer, abbot, Green Gulch Farm Zen Center the observation that “[t]he
real technology—behind all of our other technologies—is language. It actually creates
the world our consciousness lives in.”).
163. See United States Patent No. 5,730,052 (Mar. 24, 1998) (“Method of high resolution silk screen printing”). But see Greenewalt v. Stanley Co. of Am., 54 F.2d 195, 196
(3d Cir. 1931) (“We do not find authority in the law for the issuance of a patent for results dependent upon such intangible, illusory, and nonmaterial things as emotional or
aesthetic reactions.”).
164. See United States Patent No. 5,734,795 (Mar. 31, 1998) (“System for allowing
a person to experience systems of mythology”).
165. See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an
“Article of Manufacture:” Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 89, 129-34 (1998).
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created thing as encompassed within it.166 They undoubtedly contemplated the industrial, mechanical and manual arts of the late
Eighteenth Century, in contrast to the seven “liberal arts” and the
four “fine arts” of classical learning.167 The Framers were also
likely aware of the English experience leading to the Statute of
Monopolies.168 The principal aim of that legislation was to proscribe grants of monopolies except for any letters patent providing
the exclusive right “of the sole working or making of any manner
of new manufactures within this realme, to the true and first inventor . . . .”169 In a passage especially worthy of consideration following State Street, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explained that the inclusion of the patent and copyright clause in the
Constitution “doubtlessly was due to the fact that those who formulated the Constitution were familiar with the long struggle over
monopolies so prominent in English history, where exclusive
rights to engage even in ordinary business activities were granted
so frequently by the Crown . . . .”170
Whether the State Street panel has respected the policy concerns that animated the Statute of Monopolies remains questionable. Yet, in fairness to the Federal Circuit, articulation of a useful
typology between technology and other aspects of human culture
has proven exceptionally difficult. Human engagement with the
artificial has become so complete that distinguishing technological
things from those that are not has perplexed not only the courts,
but even epistemologists and the most accomplished of technologi166. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin FletcherWright, ed. 1961) (“The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason
to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims
of individuals.”). Madison’s reference to contemporary British law hardly suggests a
radical view of patentable subject matter.
167. See Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 487, 494-96 (1952). “The seven historic ‘liberal arts’ were: grammar, logic (dialectics), rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. The four ‘fine arts’ were:
painting, drawing, architecture and sculpture; to which were often added: poetry, music,
dancing and drama.” Id. at 494.
168. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part 2), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 11, 26-27 (1998).
169. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam. 1, ch. 3 §6 (1623).
170. In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (CCPA 1951) (emphasis added).
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cal observers.171
Economic analysis may offer some suggestions about the propriety of patents within particular areas of endeavor. Following
State Street, economists may be able to tell us whether the patent
system would benefit or harm particular industrial sectors by influencing such factors as the engagement in unproductive activity,
rate of innovation or market concentration. An initial sense of the
financial services industry would not appear optimistic. In-house
use of financial products appears extremely difficult to track, for
the only observable throughput consists of profits and losses on investor balance sheets.172 The policing of financial services patents
would seemingly require costly infringement searches, just the sort
of activity a sound patent system should discourage.
Economic analysis might also suggest the impact of the surprisingly strong correlation between the claims of Signature’s patent and portions of the Internal Revenue Code.173 Commentators
have expressed concerns over the attempted privatization of the
law by such efforts as claiming copyright in jump citations.174 But
such an effort appears enfeebled when compared with the more robust property right afforded by the patent grant. If, as the Federal
Circuit noted in State Street, the only practical tax code compliance mechanism for sophisticated financial products consists of
computerized accounting,175 then economists may well possess the
best set of tools for predicting the impact of patents resembling
that of Signature.
The difficulties with such attempted analyses should be apparent, however. Legal economists simply possess no experience
171. CARL MITCHAM, THINKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN
ENGINEERING AND PHILOSOPHY 154-60 (1994).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 101-105.
173. See I.R.C. § 706(d) (1994); IRS Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b), 1.704-1(f). See Richard
Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing
Business 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 132 (1999).
174. See Alfred C. Yen, The Danger of Bootstrap Formalism in Copyright, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 453 (1998); James H. Wyman, Comment, Freeing The Law: Case Reporter Copyright And The Universal Citation System, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 217 (1996);
Robin Lee Pedersen, Comment, West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Ins. (Lexis),
14 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 359 (1988).
175. 149 F.3d at 1371.
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whatsoever with patents of this sort and appear disinclined to seek
out empirical evidence that might sustain their analysis. Lacking
any data whatsoever as to the potential effect of the patent system
in the financial service and other professional communities, much
economic evaluation of this issue would seem reducible to thought
experiments offered in the same vein as traditional legal analyses.
While we should be grateful for whatever insights logical reasoning from such fundamental propositions as the downward-sloping
demand curve can give us, so too should we call for data-gathering
and refinement when economic analysis is applied to the discipline
of intellectual property.176
This Article instead draws support from comparative legal
studies and that body of thinking fashioned as the philosophy of
technology. It takes a sympathetic reading of previous attempts to
explain the place of technological activities within the whole of
human endeavor. While not the place to develop a comprehensive
metaphysics of human undertakings, this Article does attempt to
apply this learning to consider the legitimacy of the view of the
State Street court that any technique that achieves pragmatic results is patentable.
In doing so this Article follows the tack of many courts by employing the word “technology” synonymously with the constitutional term “useful art.”177 For although “technology” is not a term
the Framers would likely have commonly employed, it has come to
dominate its historical predecessor. Derived from the Greek word
“techne,”178 the first appearances of the term “technology” in English documents occurred only at the start of the seventeenth cen-

176. See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual
Property, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS 19, 19-20 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986) (“The ratio of
empirical demonstration to assumption in the literature [applying economic analysis to
the field of intellectual property] must be very close to zero . . . . I do not believe it is
unfair to say that the . . . literature of which I am aware [has] consisted of little more than
assumptions. As a consequence, this literature has taught us almost nothing, not has it
guided research or thinking so that an approach with a firmer empirical base could be developed.”).
177. See supra text accompanying note 9.
178. See DON IHDE, Philosophy of Technology: An Introduction, in PARAGON ISSUES
IN PHILOSOPHY 26 (1993).
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tury. A 1706 dictionary defining technology as “a Description of
the Arts, especially in the Mechanical,” suggests the identity of
these terms.179 Use of the term “technology” not only offers a less
cumbersome terminology, it promotes the application of a diversity
of thought about this most dominant aspect of contemporary society.
A. From Applied Science to Rational Action
The first English work to employ the term “technology” in its
title, Jacob Bigelow’s 1831 ELEMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY, serves as
a good starting point for exploring the meaning of that term. Bigelow explained that technology involved “the principles, processes,
and nomenclatures of the more conspicuous arts, particularly those
which involve applications of science.”180 Bigelow’s view of
technology as applied science remains popular today, enlisting
such supporters as Joseph Henry,181 Vannevar Bush,182 and John
Kenneth Galbraith.183 Even the Patent Office has adopted this position, defining technology as “the application of science and engineering to the development of machines and procedures in order to
enhance or improve human conditions, or at least to improve human efficiency in some respect.”184
But the simple view of technology as applied science cannot
withstand a sustained analysis. Historical technologists constructed artifacts ranging from arches to airplanes without any systematic knowledge of statics or aerodynamics.185 Contemporary
scientific disciplines from astronomy to particle physics further
suggest that this definition is skewed, for they rely so heavily upon
instrumental technologies that they could fairly be described as ap179. See MITCHAM, supra note 171, at 114, 130.
180. Jacob Bigelow, Elemenrs of Technology (1831).
181. See E.T. Layton, Jr., American Ideologies of Science and Engineering, 17
TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 688, 69 ( 1976).
182. See SUBRATA DASGUPTA, TECHNOLOGY AND CREATIVITY 151 (1996).
183. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 12 (2d rev. ed.
1971).
184. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES
FOR COMPUTER-RELATED INVENTIONS, 61 FED. REG. 7478, 7488 (Feb. 28, 1996) [hereinafter SOFTWARE GUIDELINES].
185. See GEORGE BASALLA, THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 27-28 (1988).
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plied technologies.186 And historians have demonstrated that overreliance upon scientific knowledge has sometimes hindered technological development, as successful product design proceeds
more often from “bottom-up” development than “top-down” extension of scientific theories.187
Last, this position also fails to appreciate the extraordinary differences between the tools, attitudes and experimental methods of
scientific and engineering practice.188 Although some of the theoretical tools for engineering design derive from science, many do
not and some are even problematic to the scientific community. In
particular, the set of idealized artifacts, technical skills and pragmatic considerations indigenous to engineering practice have little
place in scientific endeavors. Technology is much more than applied scientific knowledge, but is itself a distinct form of knowledge.189
Dissatisfied with a science-based definition, individuals have
sought other bases for reasoning about technology. In an era of intensive individual interaction with the artificial, we should not be
surprised to find exceptionally broad definitions of what comprises
the technological. Standard dictionaries explain that technology
concerns “bodies of skills, knowledge, and procedures for making,
using and doing useful things”190 or “systematic knowledge and
action, usually of industrial processes but applicable to any recurrent activity.”191 Essayist Daniel Bell tells us that “[t]echnology is
the instrumental ordering of human experience within a logic of ef-

186. See Don Ihde, Technics and Praxis in (1979) Boston Studies in The Philosophy
of Science (Robert S. Cohen and Mark W. Wartofsky, eds., 1979).
187. See Ronald Kline, Science and Engineering Theory in the Invention and Development of the Induction Motor, 1880-1900, 28 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 283
(1987).
188. See DASGUPTA, supra note 182, at 152-56; MITCHAM, supra note 171, at 199204.
189. See, e.g. I.C. Jarvie, Technology and the Structure of Knowledge,
in PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY: READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF
TECHNOLOGY 54, 55 (Carl Mitcham & Robert Mackey eds., 1972); MITCHAM, supra note
171, at 203.
190. 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 576 (1968).
191. MCGRAW-HILL CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1876
(3d ed. 1994).
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ficient means”;192 commentator Frederick Ferré would go further
to define technology merely as the “practical implementations of
intelligence.”193 And as Marshall McLuhan mused, on his way to
concluding that individual communications media present their
own message:
It makes no difference whether one considers as artifacts . . . things of a tangible “hardware” nature such as
bowls and clubs or forks and spoons, or tools and devices
and engines, railways, spacecraft, radios, computers and so
on; or things of a “software” nature such as theories or laws
of science, philosophical systems, . . . forms or styles in
painting or poetry or drama or music, and so. All are
equally artifacts, all equally human.194
Paradigmatic of this embracing vision of technology is the discipline of cybernetics.195 Since its emergence from early research
in neurophysiology and gradual expansion into information theory
and artificial intelligence, cybernetics has considered its subject
matter “the domain of all possible machines.”196 Disinterested in
whether that machine is “electronic, mechanical, neural, or economic,” cybernetics pursues the goal of communication and control of any regular, determinate or reproducible behavior.197 The
cybernetic vision of a device as a series of linked information
stages expands the possibilities of technological knowledge to dizzying heights. For cybernetics offers nothing less than “the
framework on which all individual machines may be ordered, related, and understood”198— a unified theory of material, social and
mental phenomenon.199
192. DANIEL BELL, THE WINDING PASSAGE: ESSAYS AND SOCIOLOGICAL JOURNEYS
1960-1980, 20 (1980).
193. FREDERICK FERRÉ, PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 26 (1988).
194. MARSHALL MCLUHAN & ERIC MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE
EXTENSIONS OF MAN 3 (2d ed. 1965).
195. See NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS, OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN
THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE (2d ed. 1961).
196. See W. ROSS ASHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETICS 2 (1956).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See MITCHAM, supra note 171, at 205. See also Allan Newell, Response: The
Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken!, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023 (1985) (collaps-
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The view of patentable subject matter expressed in State Street
fairly reflects these developments in our philosophy of technology.200 Judging methods of doing business as within the ambit of
the patent system too presents a pretentious view of technological
activity, one that has come to reject a scientific backdrop and instead concluded that the term “technology” connotes any form of
rational human action. Any technique for achieving efficiency in
any sphere of human endeavor appears amenable to patenting, so
long as that method is communicable and capable of achieving a
useful result.
Yet few of us would suppose that inventions within the domain
of business, the law or fine arts constitute technology, and in particular patentable technology. The standpoint of cybernetics is
hardly in the mainstream. Its constructions of technology often
amount to little more than provocative slogans that naively equate
all forms of knowledge and assume that all human endeavor is susceptible to rational manipulation. Other definitions appear to suffer from their conciseness, presenting as well an extreme view of
technological phenomenon.201 Still others are purposive, forming
part of the effort to subject technological issues to philosophical
inquiry, or, even worse, contemporary society to withering commentary.202
Surely we can articulate a more refined sense of that set of actions and objects that we might judge as technological in character.203 A reasoned epistemology of human activity, reflective both
of our sense of the technological order and the traditions of the
ing distinctions between the study of human behavior and computer science).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 111-116.
201. See N. Bruce Hannay & Robert E. McGinn, The Anatomy of Modern Technology: Prolegomenon to an Improved Public Policy for the Social Management of Technology, 109 DAEDALUS 25, 26 (Winter 1980) (“The nascent field of technology studies is
littered with unsuccessful attempts to capture and display the supposed Platonic essence
of technology in a succinct phrase or two.”).
202. See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE: THE PENTAGON OF POWER
(1970); JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans., 1964);
HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964).
203. But see Rachel Laudan, Introduction, in THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE: ARE MODELS OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE RELEVANT? 1, 5 (1984) (noting that
attempts to demarcate technology from other activities are “probably fruitless”).
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patent system, would allow us to better define that subject matter
which could be patented and that which could not. This Article
next takes up this effort, turning to several discussions of the ontic
dimension of technology.
B. Towards a Refined View of Technology
As a central aspect of modern life, technology has attracted a
justifiable amount of concern and commentary. Yet divergence
concerning the scope of this phenomenon has often hindered discourse. Engineering, epistemological, sociological, anthropological and phenomenological perspectives have lent the term “technology” connotations varying from artifacts, to knowledge, to
sociotechnical systems of manufacture and use.204 Despite the
ubiquity of the technological encounter, no recognized taxonomy
of technological characteristics exists.
Perceptive commentators have attempted to lend congruency
and structure to this dialogue by unpacking the term “technology.”205 A review of this literature holds promise for the patent
system as well. As the principal legal response to technological
change, the regime of patents too has suffered from its inability to
develop a coherent sense of its own subject matter. This Article
turns first to the sustained effort by Robert McGinn to define the
technological.
In several publications addressing technology policy, McGinn
has consistently identified technology as a manifestation of human
culture that takes its place alongside art, sport, philosophy and
other endeavors.206 Technology is not the same as these activities,
however, and may be distinguished by several traits. In an early
article, What is Technology?, McGinn observed that technological

204. See PAUL W. DEVORE, TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 220-22 (1980); Michael Fores, Some terms in the discussion of technology and innovation, 6 TECHNOLOGY
AND SOC’Y no.2, 56 (Oct. 1970).
205. See Stephen J. Kline, What is Technology?, 1 BULL. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
SOCIETY 215 (1988).
206. See ROBERT E. MCGINN, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 16 (1991); Hannay & McGinn, supra note 201, at 26; Robert E. McGinn, What is Technology?, in 1
RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY: AN ANNUAL COMPILATION OF RESEARCH
179, 180 (Paul T. Durbin, Ed.,1978) [hereinafter McGinn, What is Technology?].
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activity is a purposive, methodological enterprise that fabricates or
is constitutive of material outcomes.207 According to McGinn,
technology should also be seen as a resource-based and resourceexpending endeavor that necessarily utilizes or generates knowledge. He further suggests a rubric of “material product-making or
object-transforming activity” to distinguish that which is technological.208
McGinn and his colleague, N. Bruce Hannay, further developed this analysis by assessing technology in terms of its content
and form. Hannay and McGinn judged the content of technology
to be “the complex of knowledge, methods, and other resources
used in making a particular kind of product or in creating a particular procedural system.”209 That technologies could be used to
manufacture products seems straightforward enough, but some
ambiguity surrounds their sense of a “procedural system.” Do they
wish to connote discrete production techniques, or do they mean to
invoke the entire social and physical environment that surrounds
that making? While proceeding to describe the systems context of
modern technologies, Hannay and McGinn suggest the former:
Many products of modern technology, whether exhibiting
interior systematic complexity or not, are intimately intertwined with, if not embedded in, complex sociotechical
support systems on which their manufacture, use, and
maintenance depend, for example, telephones and cars. To
purchase such items is to gain admission into a web of
complex sociotechnical systems. To buy a car is, in a real
sense, to buy into a complex road, energy supply, parts distribution, maintenance, registration, insurance, police, and
legal systems.210
To Hannay and McGinn, then, the fact that technologies are inevitably embedded in cultural contexts does not render all human endeavors into technologies themselves.
Hannay and McGinn also identified several aspects of the form
207.
208.
209.
210.

McGinn, What is Technology?, supra note 206, at 180.
Id. at 181.
See Hannay & McGinn, supra note 201, at 27.
Id. at 28.

THOMASFMT.DOC

1999]

9/29/2006 3:28 PM

THE POST-INDUSTRIAL PATENT SYSTEM

43

of technology that contrast it with other human activities. The inputs to technological processes consist of raw or already processed
material along with bodies of information. Technology involves
the use of knowledge of the properties of its input resources, along
with energy, information, tools, and perceptual and neuromuscular
skills, to generate material products and procedural systems. The
function of technology is the production, management and use of
material objects, and for the control and enhancement of other
forms of human activity. Technology is thus concerned with design, fabrication and transformation.211
Technology may also be distinguished by its environmental
context. As described by Hannay and McGinn:
[T]echnology differs from other activity-forms in that the
natural environment –- both in respect to the meteorological and creature-related threats it poses to human survival,
and the spatiotemporal obstacles it presents to human desires for communication and transport –- is a factor that
more powerfully and more directly conditions technology
than is the case with other cultural forms, for example, religion and art.212
Hannay and McGinn summarized their reasoning by characterizing
technology “as that form of cultural activity devoted to the production or transformation of material objects, or the creation of procedural systems, in order to expand the realm of practical human
possibility.”213
The views of Paul W. DeVore about the nature of technology,
developed in his eponymous textbook, complement those of
McGinn.214 DeVore also differentiates technological pursuits from
other spheres of human activity, noting that:
The character of thinking involved in creating a philosophical position, a new religion, or an alternate form of government is different from the character of thinking involved
in technological activities. Thinking in technology is prob211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
See PAUL W. DEVORE, TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION (1980).
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lem specific and environmentally specific, concerned with
efficiency and the relationship of elements in the behavior
of a total system.215
To DeVore, the goal of acclimation to the physical environment is a paramount distinguishing trait of technology.216
“[T]echnological knowledge is knowledge generated through activities involved in creating adaptive systems as opposed to knowledge used to create ideological and/or social systems.”217 DeVore
also stresses that technology can only be understood within the social milieu in which it is situated. Yet he distinguishes technology
from “the associative, ideological and environmental systems of
society” and studies the relationship between technology and other
disciplines.218
While contrasting technology and science, DeVore notes that
the goal of technology is “to create new and useful products, devices, machines or systems.”219 In technological pursuits, design is
the key component for resolving problems of materials, energy, information and control. DeVore identifies as technological tools,
machines, techniques and technical systems of production, transportation and communication.220
Carl Mitcham has also recently engaged in a comprehensive
discussion of the nature of technology.221 Building upon the analysis of McGinn and his predecessors, Mitcham develops a framework for philosophical analysis that explores technology as manifested in objects, knowledge, activity and volition.222 Most useful
here is his development of a philosophy of action that embraces
technology. In a discussion oriented towards patentable processes,
development of the sense of technology as a behavioral
engagement holds great potential for refining an ontology of technology. And while the term “technology” etymologically implies
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 226.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 182-212.
MITCHAM, supra, note 171.
Id. at 157-60.
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knowledge, and is perhaps most routinely conceptualized in terms
of physical embodiments, the event of technology may be its most
significant realization. For only technology as activity brings
about the application of knowledge towards the fabrication or use
of artifacts.223
Mitcham identifies paradigmatic technological activities as
crafting, inventing, designing, manufacturing, working, operating
and maintaining.224 To Mitcham, the essence of invention—that
all-important term in the patent law—is “the concrete transformation of materials—making an imagined transformation physically
real.”225 He contrasts engineering design with artistic creation:
Art also is concerned with imagining, but its images cannot
be quantitatively analyzed—they are not subject to any
well-developed calculus. Thus art, in contrast to engineering, appears as both more intuitive and more dependent on
the senses. Although artists too are concerned to design artifacts, they necessarily do so in drawings and models that
remain much closer in their reality to the final product.
Compare, for instance, a Rembrandt sketch for a painting
with an engineering drawing of a building. Even the Rembrandt sketch is art; the engineering drawing is simply
thrown away.226
Mitcham would also distinguish between technology and technique. He suggests that the technological stresses the rational manipulation of external artifacts, while technique concerns the training of the human body and mind.227 Thus we can speak of the
techniques, but not the technologies, of hitting a baseball or organizing a political party. While technique contains unrationalized
components, technology is concerned with the conscious articulation of rules and principles. To Mitcham, the core of the technological project concerns the desire to transform the heuristics of
technique into the algorithms of practice.228
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 236.
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Mitcham also cautions against viewing all human behavior as
technology. While exploring the possibilities of technological usings, he notes that:
Although one can speak of walking on a sidewalk as using
the sidewalk, of living in a house as using the house, of
looking at a painting as using the painting, of reading a
book of poetry as using the book, of playing the violin as
using the violin, and of driving a car as using the car, in
each case the connotations are quite different. Those human activities that have a self-contained quality about
them, such as looking at a painting, reading a book, or playing the violin, seem most incorrectly described simply as
use; indeed, to do so is common only when the user has
missed the point of the objects concerned, that is, has failed
to engage them in the proper manner. If a person is described as “using a book” one would be likely to think that
he was doing something other than reading it—sitting on it,
maybe. It is noteworthy that many usings, perhaps the less
technological ones, have their own proper names, as with
looking at works of art, reading books, or playing musical
instruments.229
A review of commentators such as McGinn, DeVore and Mitcham illustrates that we can achieve a structured definition of technology. Although embedded in social systems, technology is an
endeavor that both intuition and sustained analysis would distinguish from other aspects of human society. In brief, technology
may be characterized as knowledge that is applied towards material enterprise, guided by an orientation to the external environment and the necessity of design. In its next Part, this Article attempts to apply these studies to the patent project, moving from a
characterological to a definitional strategy.
III. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS TO PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Contemporary thought demonstrates that we can achieve a refined sense of that set of activities that are properly conceived as

229. Id. at 232.
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technological. Yet applying this learning to the patent project is by
no means straightforward. This Article reviews two possible
mechanisms for affirming our sense of the technological in the patent law. The first is piecemeal in character. As exemplified by the
recent United States experience regarding patents on methods of
medical treatment,230 we might selectively prohibit patenting or
constrain the remedies available to patentees in certain areas of endeavor. Another possibility is the adoption of an essentialist definition that more completely captures our sense of the technological. Taking as its touchstone the so-called “industrial application”
standard prevalent in the world’s patent statutes,231 this Article also
explores the possibility of incorporating this standard into United
States patent law.
A. Patents and the Professions: The Medical Experience
A broad sense of patentable subject matter brings forward a set
of concerns not just of the technological sense, but also of the pursuit of the professions. Few doubts should surround the sorts of
persons who should be newly attracted to the patent system.
Bounded by the requirement of nonobviousness, the patent law
concerns disciplinary understandings that exceed the state of the
art.232 In contemporary society this sort of knowledge is often held
not just by any follower of a particular occupation, but by a member of a profession. Such occupations as medicine, law, teaching
and the ministry, the so-called “liberal professions,” are marked by
some criteria that suggest an enthusiasm for patenting: raw materials drawn from systematic learning; their practical application; and
a communicable technique.233
Yet other professional norms suggest that traditionally patentfree professions may resist the prospect of extensive appropriation
of their techniques. Patents have the potential to constrain profes-

230. See American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Ethical Issues in the Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341 (1998).
231. See Todd F. Volyn, Agreement Consummation in International Technology
Transfers, 33 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 241 (1993).
232. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994).
233. See MIKE W. MARTIN & ROLAND SCHINZINGER, ETHICS IN ENGINEERING 155-56
(1983).
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sionals in the exercise of autonomous responsibility in their practices. Further, the ability of the profession to serve the public good
may also be affected by patenting, which could alter the willingness of professionals to disseminate and put into practice new
learning. Most significantly, the tendency of professions to organize suggests that a vocal and established lobby will be on hand to
debate the place of patenting within their community.234
The patent system has experienced this phenomenon before.
Medical practitioners have for decades obtained patents on methods of medical treatment ranging from administering insulin to
treating cancer.235 Although traditionally few patentees had attempted to enforce such patents,236 in the early 1990’s Dr. Samuel
Pallin alleged that another physician infringed his patented cataract
surgery procedure.237 The lawsuit led to a raging debate that questioned the impact of patents upon medical ethics, patient care and
professional autonomy. Although some urged that such patents offered individuals incentives to invent and disclose new medical
methods, others pointed to the possibility that patents might restrict
access to life-saving techniques, lead to invasions of patient privacy, and override the culture of disclosure and peer review that
pervades the medical community.238
Following the condemnation of patents on methods of medical
treatment by the American Medical Association House of Delegates, Congress reacted by amending the Patent Act. As codified
in § 287(c), the new statute deprives patentees of remedies against
medical practitioners engaged in infringing “medical activity.”239
234. See id.
235. See William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651 (1995); United States Patent No. 5,364,838 (Nov. 15,
1994) (method of intrapulmonary administration of insulin); United States Patent No.
5,456,663 (Oct. 10, 1995) (method of treating cancer).
236. Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 354-55 (1997).
237. See Pallin v. Singer, Civ. No. 5:93-202, 1995 WL 608365 (D. Vt. May 1,
1995).
238. See Beata Gocyk-Farber, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a Compromise Between Ethics and Economics, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1527 (1997).
239. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994). See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Surgical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789
(1996).
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Although the Patent Office may still issue patents on medical
methods, the inability of such instruments to provide their owner
with any relief essentially renders them a legal nullity.240
The response of the medical establishment may serve as a good
predictor of the reaction of other professions that are newcomers to
the patent system. Already members of the business community
have expressed disbelief at the large number of patented business
methods issuing from the Patent Office, particularly those concerning Internet business models.241 Whether business and other professionals will also possess the wherewithal to persuade Congress
to create particularized patent-free spheres of activity remains to be
seen, however. Few occupations are as well-organized, imbued
with a sense of profession and capable of employing the rhetoric of
public service as the practice of medicine.
But a more forceful impediment to further amendments of the
patent statute is not practical, but legal in character. Among the
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, a component of the recently executed World Trade Organization treaty, is that “patents
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.”242 That agreement goes on
to provide that signatories may exclude from patentability “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.”243 Under a strict reading of the TRIPS Agreement, § 287(c) presents a violation: signatories may deny such
patents altogether but not discriminate against any issued patents.
Of course, this argument is rather technical. Recalling the
maxim non debet cui plus licet, quod minus est non licere–a form
of the maxim “the greater includes the lesser”—the holders of

240. Gocyk-Farber, supra note 238, at 1528.
241. See, e.g., Teresa Riordan, E-commerce Patents Reopen Legal Questions from
the Past Debate: Should a Business Method Be Made Property?, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11,
1999) at 2; Richard A. Kaplan, Intellectual Property: Patenting Business Methods a
More Viable Option, 22 CHI. LAW. 7 (Jan. 1999); Bruce W. Foudree & Peter K. Trzyna,
Patenting In Insurance Starts Shaping Up As Robust Discipline, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FINANCIAL SERVICES EDITION (Dec. 14, 1998); Robert M.
Kunstadt, Sneak Attack on U.S. Inventiveness, NAT’L L.J., NOV. 9, 1998, at A21.
242. TRIPS Agreement art. 27.
243. Id.
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medical method patents may not feel particularly aggrieved.244
Not so for inventors within other disciplines. It appears that the
solution reached in § 287(c) will remain unique to the medical
community. With piecemeal legislative reactions to an increasingly receptive patent system out of the question, we must seek
other mechanisms for obtaining sound parameters of patentable
subject matter. This Article turns to this task next, seeking a more
refined view of technological activity from comparative legal
analysis.
B. Industrial Application
A second method of limiting the scope of patent eligibility to
the technological would be to legislate an essentialist definition
into our patent statute. In this regard we can receive guidance
from two of the world’s great patent statutes, the European Patent
Convention245 and the Japanese Patent Act.246 Each of these laws
require that inventions be susceptible of so-called “industrial application” in order for patent protection to be forthcoming.247 Concise, proven and compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, the requisite of industrial applicability provides an apt way to limit the
patent system to what we understand to be technological.
The requirement of industrial application has long been part of
the German patent law.248 As originally conceived, industrial application required that patented technologies involve the treatment
244. A more accurate translation of this phrase, attributed to the Roman jurist
Ulpian, is: “He to whom the greater is lawful ought not to be debarred from the less as
unlawful.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1052 (6th ed. 1990). The most famous use of the
phrase in the patent law occurred in Justice Holmes’ noteworthy dissent in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519-20 (1917).
245. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, as amended by Decision of the
Administration Council of the European Patent Organization of December 21, 1978, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 268 [hereinafter “European Patent Convention”]. The European Patent Convention creates a centralized mechanism for granting a set of national patents effective in the contracting states.
246. Japanese Patent Act, Law No. 121 of 1959, reprinted in 6 EHS Law Bulletin
Series Japan SA-A1 (1994) [hereinafter Japanese Patent Act].
247. See European Patent Convention, supra note 245, at Art. 52; Japanese Patent
Act, supra note 246, at Art. § 29.
248. David L. Cohen, Article 69 and European Patent Integration, 92 NW.U. L.
REV. 1082 (1998).
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or processing of raw materials through mechanical or chemical
means.249 The requirement has been more recently read to require
a “technical rule for the control of natural forces,”250 or, stated
somewhat differently, “a teaching for systematic activity using
controllable natural forces for the attainment of a causally predictable result.”251
Currently the European Patent Convention presents the most
fulsome articulation of the industrial applicability standard. Article 52 of the European Patent Convention stipulates that the following shall not be considered patentable inventions:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
(b) aesthetic creations;
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts,
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers;
(d) presentations of information.252
Article 57 of the European Patent Convention goes on to provide that “[a]n invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.”253 In its Examination Guidelines, the
European Patent Office describes Article 57 as a reinforcing provision that excludes from patentability few inventions not set forth in
Article 52.254
That Article 52 expressly excludes “programs for computers”
may seem implausible to many, especially those familiar with the

249. Rainer Moufang, Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law, 24 INT’L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 18, 22 (1993).
250. A.E.K. v. Federal Patent Office, 15 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
82, 83 (1984) (reporting the September 21, 1982 opinion of the Swiss Supreme Court).
251. Gert Kolle, The Patentable Invention in the European Patent Convention, 5
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 140, 146 (1974).
252. European Patent Convention, supra note 245, art. 52.
253. European Patent Convention, supra note 245, art. 57.
254. See GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Part C at
40 (1994).
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European Patent Office Gazette. In fact, the European Patent Office has drawn a distinction between computer software per se and
its application towards the resolution of technical problems, and
excluded from patentability only the former class of inventions.255
Thus such inventions as manufacturing control software, signal
processing and CAD/CAM systems have been held patentable.256
The European Patent Office has also granted claims relating to the
functioning of the computer as such, including programs concerning memory management, data organization and operating systems.257 However, computer-related inventions relating to such
matters as processing text258 or learning to play a keyboard instrument259 have been rejected as lacking a technical effect.
The Japanese Patent Office has also issued extensive guidelines
on the industrial application requirement.260 That agency views the
requirement of industrial application to complement the Japanese
Patent Act’s definition of a statutory invention, the “creation of
technical ideas utilizing natural laws.”261 Inventions claiming discoveries or natural laws as such, mere discoveries, personal skill,
the mere presentation of information, aesthetic creations and matter contrary to natural laws are judged to be nonstatutory.262
The Japanese Patent Office Guidelines also identify a number
of inventions that fail to fulfill the standard of industrial application. Methods of medical treatment and inventions utterly incapable of practical deployment, such as the method of preserving the
ozone layer by covering the entire surface of the earth with ultraviolet light-absorbing film, fall within this category.263 In addition,
the Japanese Patent Office also denies patentability to inventions
255. See Sean J. Hackett, Patent Protection in Europe For Software Inventions, 479
PLI/Pat 889 (May 5, 1997).
256. VICOM, Decision T 208/84, [1987] OJ EPO 14 (July 15, 1986).
257. See Data processor network/IBM, T 6/83, [1990] O.J. EPO 5 (Oct. 6, 1988).
258. See Document abstracting and retrieving, T 22/85, [1990] O.J. EPO 12 (Oct.
5, 1988).
259. See Marker/BEATTIE, T 603/89, 1992 O.J. EPO 230 (July 3, 1990).
260. See JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION
OF INDUSTRIALLY APPLICABLE INVENTIONS (April 1, 1997) [hereinafter Japanese Patent
Office Guidelines]..
261. Japanese Patent Act, supra note 246, at Art. 2(1).
262. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE GUIDELINES, supra note 260, at 1-4.
263. Id. at 4-7.
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that lack a commercial character. Among such inventions are
those limited to individual use, such as a method of smoking a
cigarette.264
Although the European and Japanese patent systems share a
sense of the industrial applicability requirement, their congruence
with the informed views of technological philosophy does not appear promising at first glance. Patent laws and regulations lack the
quality of disciplined reflection apparent in the writings of technological philosophy. Indeed, the pronunciative and succinct nature
of these administrative texts contrasts strongly with the sustained
and reasoned discussion of other observers in delimiting that which
is technological.
But despite the differing purposes and perspectives of these authors, the industrial application standard appears very much in
keeping with the characterizations of technology offered by contemporary technological thinking. In essence both regimes recognize their own subject matter by its distinguishing traits: production or transformation of artifacts; interaction with the external
environment; systematic manipulation of physical forces; and the
presence of design. Technological activities expend resources and
knowledge in order to fabricate or modify products, or to develop
procedural systems for so doing. Last, technology presents a form
of rational and systematic knowledge, oriented towards efficiency
and capable of being assessed through objective criteria.265
As in other contexts, to include some things is to exclude others. The touchstone of industrial application would exempt from
the patent system matters of social observation or human behavior.
Along with techniques from economics, psychology and the social
sciences, methods of doing business would also lack the requisite
of industrial applicability. Business methods may be amenable to
reasoned analysis and motivated towards efficient practice, but
they are not transformative in character. They do not manipulate
physical forces to achieve the production or transformation of material objects. Such methods engage economic principles rather
than the laws of physics, chemistry or biology. They do not com264. Id. at 7.
265. See supra Part II.B.
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prise technology, and should not be within the grasp of the patent
system.
The industrial application standard would also remove from the
patent system matters of the aesthetic or personal skill. Culturally
and historically, we would not count endeavors in such fields as
athletics, dance or surgery as technological, and neither should our
patent system. To view these things as technology is, as Mitcham
says, to approach them in an improper manner.266 However such
methods as swinging baseball bats, performing dance steps or
dressing wounds call for the manipulation of external objects, these
aspects of human society are principally acquired through personal
experience. They do not involve the creation or transformation of
material objects and are not repeatable in an industrial sense. We
also appear to lack objective mechanisms for evaluating this subject matter in light of the requisites of patentability.
The bearing of the industrial application standard towards
claims drafted in artifact format appears more complex. The State
Street opinion provides a fine example of this difficulty, for
the claims at issue there were drafted not in method format, but in
terms of a “data processing system” consisting of hardware elements.267 This orientation towards artifacts proved to be particularly deft claim drafting, for the Federal Circuit reposed great confidence in this characterization and repeatedly spoke of Signature’s
invention as a “machine” within the grasp of the patent statute.268
A machine, unlike a pure process claim directed towards a business method, would at first blush appear susceptible to industrial
application. Yet if our sense of patent eligibility becomes wholly
subject to artful claim drafting, we have little hope of confining the
patent system to the technological.269
The decision of the United Kingdom Patent Courts in Merrill
Lynch presents a sensible resolution of this question.270 Of course,
the patent law of the United Kingdom reflects that of the European
Patent Convention in requiring that patentable inventions be capa266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See supra text accompanying note 229.
149 F.3d at 1371.
See supra text accompanying note 111.
See Thomas, supra note 98, at 257-61.
Merrill Lynch Inc.’s Application, [1988] RPC 1.
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ble of industrial application.271 Further, the application at issue,
directed towards an automatic securities trading system, was
analogous to that of the patent in State Street. Merrill Lynch’s application described a computerized system that allowed customers
to buy and sell stocks. The patent claims were set forth in functional terms, reciting a data processing system for enabling a securities trading market.272
Following a rejection of the application by the examiner,
Merrill Lynch requested a hearing at the United Kingdom Patent
Office. The principal examiner affirmed in reasoning that appears
fully applicable to the facts in State Street:
If the task performed is non-technical, for example a
mathematical calculation or a business method, then the
mere fact that it is being performed by a suitable machine,
whether or not this involves a program, does not of itself
provide a technical feature. I consider this to be a logical
extension of the generally accepted view that there is no invention in merely stating that a known manual function is
performed automatically even if this is expressed in terms
of “means” for performing the essential parts of the function.
I consider that the “means” specified . . . relate to features
which either would be present in a conventional business
computer system or define essential features required for
the performance of the business method. Consequently this
claim contains nothing which could be considered to constitute a new technical structure or to produce a technical
effect . . . . I conclude therefore that this claim does not
constitute a patentable invention.273
The Patents Court once again affirmed on appeal. Applying
Article 52 of the European Patent Convention, the court noted the
argument of counsel that:
whether a patent could be obtained for a computer program,
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Merrill Lynch Inc.’s Application, [1988] RPC 1.
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itself novel and not obvious, would be a matter of drafting,
depending on the form of claim drafted. If claimed as a
computer program it would not be patentable as excluded
under [Article 52]; but a computer programmed to carry out
that program would be patentable even though a conventional computer operating in a conventional manner when
carrying out the various steps of the program. That seems
to me to be a result that cannot have been intended by Parliament.274
Similar analysis should apply to “system” claims drafted to
convey the sense of a hardware embodiment. If we mean to exclude methods of doing business from the regime of patents, then
we should as well reject claims reciting computerized methods
where the only patentable teaching lies in the realm of business
rather than technology. To do otherwise is to exalt form over substance, an argument that has been made extensively elsewhere.275
The United States Patent Office’s recently issued Software
Guidelines appear to urge similar results. The Guidelines recognize that because “[t]here is always some form of physical transformation within a computer because a computer acts on signals
and transforms them during its operation and changes the state of
its components during the execution of a process,” such activity
alone is not determinative.276 The Guidelines instead provide that
the “utility of the invention must be within the technological arts”
for it to be patentable, pointing to the familiar requirements of
physical transformation and practical application.277 Based on this
and other text within the Guidelines, at least one commentator
concluded that the Guidelines would render most computerimplemented business methods unpatentable.278
The Patent Office Deputy Commissioner took a different position, however, instead considering the Federal Circuit’s State
274. Merrill Lynch’s Application, [1989] RPC 561.
275. Most articulately in Stern, supra note 63. See also Richard H. Stern, Solving
the Algorithm Conundrum: After 1994 In the Federal Circuit, the Patent Law Needs a
Radical Algorithmectomy, 22 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 167 (1994).
276. SOFTWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 7484.
277. Id. at 7479, 7483.
278. See Del Gallo, supra note 46, at 425-27.

THOMASFMT.DOC

1999]

9/29/2006 3:28 PM

THE POST-INDUSTRIAL PATENT SYSTEM

57

Street opinion to have “ratified the validity of the approach taken”
in the Guidelines.279 Given the “Delphic” character of the Guidelines280 and their inability to dictate examiner decisions,281 overreliance upon the Guidelines seems inappropriate. The fact remains
that the Patent Office has experienced a “boom” in applications
claiming business methods and, following State Street, appears
obliged to allow them to mature into granted patents.282
A legislative approach appears the best possibility for reminding the patent system that not everything we do is technological.
Congress would do well to import the requirement of industrial applicability into United States patent law. This touchstone not only
parallels much of the teachings of contemporary thought concerning technology, it would provide a proven criterion that already effects the majority of the world’s issued patents. And not only does
the TRIPS Agreement expressly allow signatories to impose this
requirement,283 its adoption would move the United States further
in the direction of global patent harmonization.284
Of course, no claim can be made that industrial application
would offer a panacea for our patent eligibility ills. The European
Patent Office has arguably drifted from the reasoning of Merrill
Lynch in a handful of recent opinions involving computerimplemented methods.285 The Japanese Patent Office too seems
279. See Oberdorfer, supra note 7.
280. Richard H. Stern, On Defining the Concept of Infringement of Intellectual
Property Rights in Algorithms and Other Computer-Related Ideas, 23 AM. INTELL. PROP.
L. ASS’N Q.J. 401, 408 n.17 (Summer 1995).
281. See SOFTWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 7479 (“These Guidelines do not
constitute substantive rulemaking and hence do not have the force and effect of law.”).
282. See Oberdorfer, supra note. 7.
283. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 27(1).
284. See HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION § 2300 (1993).
285. In particular see the controversial decision General-Purpose Management System/SOHEI, T 769/92, 1995 OJ EPO 525 (May 31, 1994). The lengthy claims at issue
before the European Patent Office Board of Appeal defined computer hardware, data
storage files, and a plurality of processing means for controlling the hardware and for
storing, updating, reading and outputting the data. The patent application described the
system as useful for financial and inventory management, and in particular construction
management. Thus the system might, for example, track the work to be done on a particular site within the construction industry.
According to the Board, the claimed invention involved technical considerations because it involved a novel use of different files to cause the computer to perform different
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favorably disposed towards the patenting of known computer
hardware that does no more than process data in a novel way.286
But adoption of the industrial application standard here would render the current patentability debate a far more sober one. Rather
than remain paralyzed by the complex issues surrounding the patentability of computer-related inventions, we should recognize that
a broader movement is afoot. The stewards of our patent system
would do well to consider informed responses to our increasingly
ambitious scope of patenting, rather than rely upon the patent bar
to stage an informed debate on the appropriate vision of appropriable subject matter.
CONCLUSION
Each issue of the Patent Office Gazette seems to include proprietary processes from an unlikely collection of disciplines. Although we once might have relegated these claims to some popular
compilation of unusual patents,287 the Federal Circuit opinions in
State Street and Excel have imbued them with a newfound vitality.
With the Patent Office open to patents on business method and
data transformation, the frontiers of the patent system appear virtually without limit. The patent system now seems poised to impact
callings ranging from the arts, to the social sciences, to the law itself.
There is much to commend the adoption of the standard of industrial application in the United States patent law. For our patent
law should comport with our perception of what technology is, not
defy it. By restoring a patentablility standard firmly grounded in
industrial applicability, rather than equating technology with anytasks. Moreover, the Board noted that management of construction sites was comparable
to the management of traditional manufacturing processes. The claimed invention could
therefore not be considered a method of doing business excluded from patentability by
the European Patent Convention. Although arguably quite a different case than Merrill
Lynch, the reasoning of the SOHEI Board offers ample possibilities for artful claims
drafters to overcome the restrictions upon patentable subject matter within the European
Patent Convention.
286. See JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR INVENTIONS IN
SPECIFIC FIELDS, Computer Software Related Inventions, § 2.2.1, (c)-2 (iii) (1997)
(AIPPI).
287. See e.g., RICK FEINBERG, PECULIAR PATENTS (1994).
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thing artificial, we would also maintain the patent system in its
proven paths. We would recognize our own humanity by refusing
to identify our entire universe as technological in character.288
However central to contemporary life and worthy of nurturing
through the patent system, technology is but one manifestation of
the human experience, not the only one.

288. The writings of Martin Heidegger suggest this concern. See Martin Heidegger,
The Question Concerning Technology, in BASIC WRITINGS, 287, 308 (David Farrell Krell
trans., 1977) (“As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object,
but exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but
the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall,
that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standingreserve.”); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, DISCOURSE ON THINKING 56 (John M. Anderson & E.
Hans Freund trans., 1966) (“the approaching tide of technological advancement in the
atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking
may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.”).

